Credit Rationing and Firm Exports: Micro Evidence from SMEs in China by Cheng, Dong et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Credit Rationing and Firm Exports:
Micro Evidence from SMEs in China
Dong Cheng and Yong Tan and Jian Yu
Economics Department, Vanderbilt University, School of
international economics and trade, Nanjing University of Finance
and Economics & Vanderbilt University, School of Economics,
Central University of Finance and Economics
12 October 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/81914/
MPRA Paper No. 81914, posted 13 October 2017 09:10 UTC
Credit Rationing and Firm Export: Micro
Evidence From SMEs in China¶
Dong Cheng† Yong Tan‡ Jian Yu§
Abstract
In this study we examine the effect of credit rationing on export performance for small
and medium sized firms in China. We use a detailed firm-level data provided by the
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Dynamic Survey (SMEDS) to conduct this analysis.
SMEDS provides firm-specific measures of credit rationing based directly on firm-level
responses to the survey rather than indirectly from firm-level financial statements. We
find that, at the extensive margin, weak and strong credit rationing reduce SMEs’ export
probability by 22% and 36%, respectively. At the intensive margin, they decrease SMEs’
export values by more than 32% and over 66%, respectively. Different from existing
literature, we construct valid firm-level instruments, firm-level housing investments and
receivables, for credit rationing rather than using province-level instruments. In addition,
credit rationing exhibits heterogeneous impacts on firms with different liquidity ratios,
product portfolios, external collateral and capital utilization rates.
Keywords:
SMEs · Strong Credit Rationing · Weak Credit Rationing · Export Performance
JEL Classification: F10; G20
¶Corresponding Author: Jian Yu and Yong Tan are the corresponding authors.
†Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, email: dong.cheng@vanderbilt.edu
‡School of International Economics and Trade, Nanjing University of Finance and Economics,
email: yongtan econ@163.com
§School of Economics, Central University of Finance and Economics, email:
jianyu@cufe.edu.cn
1
1. Introduction
Financial market development has a pronounced influence on economic growth
through offering external finance for firm expansion and exporting (Lizal and Sve-
jnar, 2002; Guiso et al., 2004; Benfratello et al., 2008; Berman and He´ricout, 2010;
Feenstra et al., 2014; Mancusi and Vezzulli, 2014; Chaney, 2016). An advanced
and frictionless financial market encourages firm-level R&D investment, innova-
tion, and export entry (Lizal and Svejnar, 2002; Guiso et al., 2004; Luisa and
Vezzulli, 2014). R&D and innovation are treated as key factors which determine
firm export performance, but one characterized by high fixed costs.1 At the same
time, penetrating into foreign markets requires huge start-up fixed costs (Arko-
lakis, 2011; Minetti and Zhu, 2011; Manova, 2013; Bai et al., 2017). Berman and
He´ricout (2010) show that firms need to collect information on foreign markets,
adapt products and packaging to fit foreign preferences, set up distribution net-
works and advertize for marketing penetration. Export entry costs, for instance,
are estimated range from 347,549 to 538,986 U.S. dollars for Chilian exporters (see,
Morales et al., 2011). These features highlight the importance of external finance
on firm export performance.
With the availability of micro firm-level data, a growing body of literature has
started to examine the link between financial market imperfections and firm-level
export performance. However, causal evidence of link between financial constraints
and firm export performance is still mixed. Greenaway et al. (2007), for instance,
1Aw et al. (2011) and Dai and Yu (2013), for instance, separately document that firms which
invest in R&D prior to their export are more likely to success and gain productivity growth after
export. However, despite the benefits of R&D, only large firms can afford the expensive fixed
R&D costs and achieve export success.
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find that financial constraints have a trivial effect on firm export participation.
Berman and He´ricout (2010), in contrast, document a strong link between finan-
cial development and firm-level extensive/intensive margins of exporting. The
inconclusive results are due to the heterogeneous firm-level reliance on external
finance.2 In particular, large firms can finance their R&D and market entry costs
using internal liquidity, and rely less on the external finance. In contrast, small
and medium sized enterprizes (SMEs thereafter) often lack internal liquidity, and
depend more on financial markets to finance R&D and market entry costs. There-
fore, the objective of this paper is to fill the gap in the literature by studying
the impact of credit rationing caused by financial market imperfections on SMEs’
export performance.
China offers an ideal setting to investigate the causal effect of credit rationing
on the export performance of SMEs. First, commercial banks in China issue
their loans disproportionately across firms in the private sector, which contain the
majority of SMEs. In particular, Firth et al. (2009) find that state-owned banks in
China issue loans to SMEs according to their financial health and organizational
efficiency. This feature provides variation in credit rationing at the firm-level,
which helps to identify the effect of credit rationing on SMEs. Second, SMEs
are likely to face higher costs of external finance in China relative to state-owned
enterprises (SOEs thereafter), and are typically more constrained in their R&D
investment decisions than large established firms.3 As such, a considerable share
of SMEs in China engage in exporting through state-owned intermediaries (see,
2Manova et al. (2015) also highlight the heterogeneous impact of financial constraints on
firms of different productivity and belonging to different industries.
3Cull and Xu (2003) document that in China SOEs can obtain policy loans or transfers at
relatively low costs, but this type of loan are not available to SMEs.
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Bai et al., 2017). Bai et al. (2017) show that although the indirect exporting mode
reduces the fixed costs of exporting, it also reduces firm-level export profits and the
opportunity to learn from exporting. This makes evaluating credit rationing on
SMEs’ export behavior, like exporting mode, of policy importance. Third, SMEs
account for over 90% of registered enterprises in China, and 60% of GDP (see, Lin
et al., 2015). In addition, SMEs in China created 80% job openings in urban areas
in 2014. The important role played by SMEs in Chinese economy makes it essential
to alleviate financial market imperfections and financial constraints for SMEs,
which will effectively boost Chinese economy. Fourth, SMEs are not contained
in the commonly used data set called Annual Survey of Industrial Production
(ASIP) since ASIP only records production information of SOEs and non-SOEs
with annual sales exceeding 5 million RMB (which is roughly $770,000). Although
some literature has examined the effect of credit rationing on firm export behaviors
in developed countries, like Italy (e.g. Minetti and Zhu, 2011), the study on SMEs
in developing countries, like China, are rare due to the difficulty of collecting
reliable information.
With a novel and unique data set containing firm-level information on financial
constraints and production of SMEs in the Zhejiang province,4 we can identify the
casual effect of credit rationing on firm export performance. In particular, each
firm has to answer a question whether it has difficulty accessing external finance.
If the answer is yes, the firm is defined as credit rationed.5 We find that credit
rationing has a statistically significant and negative effect on firm-level extensive
4Zhejiang province is an export oriented province. In 2014, trade values account for more
than 50% of GDP in Zhejiang Province. In addition, SMEs in Zhejiang account for 97% of all
registered firms.
5Please see section 2.2 for more details about the definition of firm-level credit rationing.
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and intensive export margins. Specifically, credit rationing decreases SMEs’ export
probabilities by 22.1% to 36.0%. At the same time, credit rationing reduces firm-
level export values by more than 32.2% (weak credit rationing) to more than 66.1%
(strong credit rationing). In contrast, the effect of credit rationing on firm-level
domestic sales is only marginally significant, and is estimated to have a smaller
impact. Furthermore, we find that credit rationing has a more pronounced impact
on an extensive margin of exporting for firms that face liquidity constraints, ex-
port multi-products, obtain collateral from other firms, and have a higher capital
utilization rate. As a comparison, the effect of credit rationing on the intensive
margin of exporting is stronger for firms that face liquidity constraints, export
multi-products, obtain no external collateral, and have lower capital utilization
rates. All results are robust even after accounting for endogeneity and sample
selection issues.
Our work is closely related to Manova (2013) and Manova et al. (2015) which
document the effect of financial constraints on firm-level export performance. How-
ever, different from Manova (2013) and Manova et al. (2015), we have a direct
measure of firm-level financial constraints, credit rationing, rather than using the
firm-level liquidity ratio or leverage ratio as an indirect proxy. The use of credit
rationing can significantly reduce the effects of confounding factors, primarily the
availability of alternative sources of external finance. Pecking order theory (Myers
and Majluf, 1984) predicts that the firm would prefer debt finance to equity financ-
ing when internal liquidity is insufficient. As such, it is necessary to control for
the availability of firm’s equity financing and preferences over alternative sources
of external finance when using indirect proxies of firm-level financial constraints.
Our study is also in line with Minetti and Zhu (2011) who document the impact of
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credit rationing on Italian firms’ export behaviors. However, different from Minet-
ti and Zhu (2011), we construct firm-level instruments for credit rationing rather
than using province-level instruments. The advantage of using firm-level instru-
ments is to avoid clustering the standard errors to a higher aggregate level, and
alleviate weak instrument issues.6 Furthermore, to our best knowledge, this is the
first paper which uses firm-level data from a developing country, China, to anwer
the question of how credit rationing affect export performance for SMEs. SMEs
in developing countries can be very different from their counterparts in developed
countries. For instance, lack of alternative external finance sources may lead SMEs
in China rely more on bank loans.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in section 2 we introduce the back-
ground of SMEs in China, and section 3 outlines the features of our data and
variables. Section 4 presents the estimation strategy and empirical results. In
section 5, we report the heterogeneous effect of credit rationing on different firms.
Section 6 displays robustness check and section 7 concludes.
2. Background
We first introduce background information on Chinese small and medium-sized
enterprises to demonstrate that it is worth exploring the effect of credit rationing on
these firms. Then, we discuss the nature of firm-level borrowing against collateral
in China, in the hope of rationalizing the construction of our instrumental variables
6 The correlation between province credit rationing ratio might be weakly correlated with
firm credit rationing, but according to the policy in China, firm-level housing investments and
receivables are strongly correlated with firm-level credit rationing.
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for credit rationing.
2.1. Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
China provides an ideal setting for testing the impact of credit rationing on export
decisions by SMEs, because SMEs are strategically important for the economy on
the one hand and are more credit rationed by banks on the other. First, SMEs
are an indispensable part of the economy. According to Lin et al. (2015), there
were more than 80 million SMEs in 2014, accounting for over 90% of registered
firms in China. Moreover, they contribute to over 50% of tax revenues, more than
60% of gross domestic product (GDP), nearly 70% of trade volume (imports and
exports), and around 80% of urban employment. These figures indicate that SMEs
play a crucial role in expanding tax base, building wealth, and creating jobs.
Second, SMEs disproportionately suffer from more severe credit rationing than
large firms.7 Like the Italian case documented by Minetti and Zhu (2011), firms in
China also access external finance mainly through loans offered by banks. In 2014,
the ratio between banking deposits and stock market capitalization was 130%, and
the ratio between stock market capitalization and GDP was only 58.5%. These
ratios suggest that stock markets are relatively underdeveloped in China, and
banking loans are the main source of external finance for firms to cover investment
and upfront export costs. Compared with large firms, SMEs are more likely to
be credit rationed when applying for banking loans. As creditors, banks optimally
support large firms that have greater collaterals and stronger cash flows. For SMEs,
7Compared with foreign affiliates and joint ventures, SMEs are also more credit constrained.
Manova et al. (2015) demonstrate that foreign firms can overcome credit frictions by obtaining
liquidity from their parent companies.
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banks typically require higher interest rates and turn down their applications more
frequently. In addition, large firms receive preferential treatment because they are
more economically important to the local economy and hence have tighter political
connection with local governments.8 Lin et al. (2015) document that only 10% of
SMEs in Zhejiang province successfully received loans from banks in 2014, while
the rest had to rely on self-raised funds or private loans (like usurious loans).
Third, in recent years, the Chinese central government has initiated a slew of
policies to help SMEs, including increasing government transfers as special funds,
reducing or even exempting valued-added and sales taxes, and creating an equal
business environment. Since fiscal transfers and tax reduction tend to have a short-
run impact on easing the difficulty faced by SMEs, the central government has
switched to relying more on creating an fair business environment for SMEs by
reducing the frictions and distortions imposed on SMEs. A key component of a fair
business environment is equal access to external finance provided by banks. Though
the central government has taken measures like subsidizing banks to encourage
them supply credit to SMEs, more changes along this line are needed to help the
growth of SMEs. In this study, we explore the effects of credit rationing on SME
export performance, and provide straightforward policy implications for the central
government for supporting SMEs to expand beyond national borders. Equal access
to external finance is of particular importance for SMEs to penetrate into foreign
markets. As shown by Das et al. (2007), serving international markets involves
8State-owned banks are the dominating suppliers of banking credits in China. This feature,
when combined with the strong political connection between large firms and local governments,
implies that large firms are more likely to get loans from banks in an ex ante perspective. The ex
post result generally could be that they receive loans with lower interest rates or their applications
are rejected with much lower possibilities.
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tremendous entry costs that mostly must be paid up front.
2.2. Firms’ Borrowing against Collateral in China
Two important features of that characterize how firms borrow against collateral in
China also determine how we construct firm-level instrumental variables for credit
rationing. The first feature is the wide acceptance of housing as collateral in firms’
borrowing, and the second one is the advocacy of pledging accounts receivable
as collateral by the central government. Existing theoretical studies (e.g. Barro,
1976; Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Hart and Moore, 1994) have long recognized the
role of collateral in enhancing firms’ financial capacity when there exists incom-
plete contracting. Though empirical studies lag behind theoretical analysis, recent
work by Gan (2007) and Chaney et al. (2012) provide supporting evidence for the
economic significance of the collateral channel in affecting firms’ financing capacity
and hence investment. In this study, we relate firms’ holding of collateral to credit
rationing because the degree of credit rationing received by firms can be largely
predicted by their ability to borrow against collateral.
Housing is the most widely accepted collateral against borrowing by banks in
China, mainly due to the low risk to be transferred in defaults and high potential
for appreciation.9 When lending to firms, banks are more likely to accept immov-
able properties as collateral because it reduces the risk that firms can transfer the
collateral with low costs before they formally default. Land and housing are two
representative types of immovable properties, and employed as the main forms of
9For instance, Fang et al. (2015) point out that only housing can act as collateral for mortgage
loans extended by commercial banks in China.
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collateral for firm borrowing in developed economies.10 In urban China, all land is
publicly owned and firms can only rent land from local governments. The lease of
land also devalues steadily as it approaches the expiring date of the lease. Conse-
quently, Chinese commercial banks generally prefer housing to land as collateral
for firms’ borrowing.
In addition to low risk of transfer before default, housing collateral is welcomed
by banks because it has strong capacity to maintain value against the backdrop
of a decade-long housing boom in China. The value-preserving characteristic of
housing helps banks to secure a greater amount of repayment in liquidation when
firms default. This characteristic is closely related to the great Chinese real estate
boom since 2003. Glaeser et al. (2017) document that, during 2003-2014, real
housing prices in China rose by over 10% per year. Even the U.S. housing boom
between 1996 and 2006 pales in comparison to the Chinese housing boom as real
house prices grew by only 5% per year in the U.S. case. The continuing real estate
boom bolsters the expected appreciation for housing, and hence lending strong
support to housing when firms pledge it as collateral to borrow from banks.
Recently, a series of institutional reforms have been implemented by the central
government to encourage firms to pledge their accounts receivable as an alterna-
tive type of collateral against external financing.11 Pledging accounts receivable as
collateral is of particular importance for SMEs. Compared to large firms, SMEs
10The importance of land and housing in firm’s borrowing against collateral has inspired
economists to quantify effects of the collateral channel. Liu et al. (2013) explore how changes in
land values affect firms’ borrowing capacity and investment by calibrating a DSGE model to the
U.S. economy, while Chaney et al. (2012) investigate how increases in house prices lift firm-level
collateral constraints and raise their investment using COMPUSTAT data for U.S. listed firms.
11Udell (2014) indicate that pledging accounts receivable as collateral has been growing in
the United States since 2000, and argue that this asset-based financing is primarily targeting at
SMEs.
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in China generally tend to rent rather than own housing when doing business.
The absence of property rights on immovable assets degrades their financing ca-
pacity from banks, and hence aggravating the credit constraints faced by SMEs.
In October 2007, the Property Law of the People’s Republic of China went into
effect. This civil code lays the institutional foundation for firms to pledge movable
properties like accounts receivable as collateral against external financing. Ever
since 2007, more and more SMEs are employing accounts receivable as collateral
for banking loans, especially in East China where financial markets are relatively
developed. The central government has also made increasing efforts to promote
the use of accounts receivable as collateral because both SMEs and banks need to
learn the practice when it is newly introduced.
3. Data and Measurement
In this section, we first introduce the microeconomic data used in our empirical
analysis, and then describe the measurement of key variables. We also briefly
summarize these key variables in this section.
3.1. Data
The microeconomic data we use in this study is from the Small and Medium-
sized Enterprises Dynamic Survey (henceforth, SMEDS). It has been conducted
monthly by the department of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, an affiliate
of the Economics and Information Commission of Zhejiang Province in China,
from August 2011 onwards. The survey is directed to SMEs within the Zhejiang
province. We have access to SMEDS over fourteen months, from July 2015 to
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August 2016.12
SMEDS has two key advantages for our study. The first advantage is that
SMEDS is a microeconomic survey that is designed specifically for SMEs. Unlike
the frequently used Annual Survey of Industrial Production (ASIP) that focuses
on above-scale manufacturing firms (for a brief review of ASIP, see Brandt et al,
2014), SMEDS only surveys below-scale enterprises. According to China’s National
Bureau of Statistics (NBS), above-scale firms in 2011 and beyond are firms that
have an annual sales value no less than 20 million yuan (equivalent to $3 million),
while below-scale firms capture the remaining forms.13 Below-scale firms are not
included in ASIP. This omission has motivated local governments to design special
surveys for them, in order to monitor the operation of these enterprises. SMEDS
is one of the special surveys designed by the local government of Zhejiang province
to follow the evolution of SMEs in that province. In this study we formally define
SMEs as firms with an annual sales value between 5 million and 20 million yuan
(roughly $775,000 to $ 3 million) during 2015-2016. This is exactly the same as
the definition used by SMEDS, and SMEDS only collects information for SMEs
defined in this way. Therefore, SMEDS provides a unique microeconomic data to
investigate how credit rationing faced by SMEs affects their export performance.
A second advantage is that SMEDS is conducted in Zhejiang province where
SMEs are particularly important for the local economy and the export sector
12A benefit of recent microeconomic data is that it helps us to obtain time-relevant policy
implications. The recent data is an appropriate proxy of the status quo, so policy implications
from them reflect measures needed to solve current problems.
13Note that the definition of above- and below-scale firms changes over time. Between 1998
and 2007, firms with annual sales value no less than 5 million yuan were counted as above-scale
firms. In 2011, the cutoff value was raised by the NBS to 20 million yuan, somewhat reflecting the
spectacular growth of Chinese economy. The new cutoff value was remained unchanged during
2011-2016.
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is quite large. We know that SMEs are a strategically indispensable part for the
Chinese economy as a whole. It is even more so for Zhejiang province because SMEs
account for around 97% of firms in this province.14 In fact, Zhejiang is well-known
in China for the local agglomeration of SMEs. This coastal province is located in an
economically advanced area of China (including also Shanghai and Jiangsu) that
has a higher degree of financial development and a better institutional framework
for small-scale businesses, and has accordingly attracted a large number of SMEs.
Besides the economic significance of SMEs, Zhejiang also has a very strong export
sector. In 2014, the ratio between trade volume (imports and exports) and GDP
is around 55% in Zhejiang, while the ratio for China as a whole is barely larger
than 40%. These two features make Zhejiang a particular interesting province in
which to explore the effects of credit rationing on SMEs’ export performance.
SMEDS is designed and conducted with caution to ensure representativeness
and reliability of the sample. A stratified sampling method is employed to guar-
antee the representativeness of the data. At the province level, the department of
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises distributes sample size to all prefectures with-
in the province, where disproportionately larger weights are assigned to prefectures
with a smaller number of SMEs to ensure representativeness at the bottom. Within
the prefectures, a similar way of assignment is employed to distribute sample size
to all counties. At the county level, SMEs are chosen using simple random sampling
where all SMEs in the county are surveyed with equal probabilities. When a firm
is chosen by SMEDS, it is required to report survey information through a unified
online platform. Two complementary measures are taken to ensure the reliability
14More information on the importance of SMEs for Zhejiang Province can be found in the
official website managed by the local government: http://www.zjsme.gov.cn/.
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of data. First, the reported information is subject to several standard checks of
logical consistency for local investigators. The checks are not only implemented at
the firm-level, but also at the local administrative level (county or prefecture) by
comparing summary statistics from SMEDS with other sources of data. Second,
the quality of data within a local administrative level is attached to the transfer of
special funds for supporting SMEs from the central government to the local area.
This incentivizes local governments to closely monitor the reporting of data, in
order to receive more fiscal transfers from the central government.
We utilize SMEDS for the year of 2015 to conduct our empirical analysis, in
consideration of both the research question and data availability. In the current
study, we are exploring how credit rationing affects SMEs’ exporting behavior.
As for this research question, it is more reasonable to use annual data rather
than monthly data because firms’ export behavior could exhibit strong seasonali-
ty. Furthermore, over the fourteen months from July 2015 to August 2016, SMEDS
requires firms to report accumulated values within the year. This means that we
could use information reported in December 2015 as the annual information for
the year of 2015.15 The 2015 SMEDS provides us detailed information on firm-level
demographics (like address and sector code), exporting, credit rationing, produc-
tion, and balance sheets. A total of 14249 firms are randomly chosen and surveyed
by the 2015 round of SMEDS.
15Apparently, this also means that we could not conduct annual empirical analysis for the
year of 2016 because our sample ends in August 2016.
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3.2. Measurement
We describe the measurement of four types of variables: exports, credit rationing,
control variables, and instruments. Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.
[Table 1 is to be here]
Exports Using SMEDS, we define both an extensive and an intensive margin of
exporting for firms. If a firm reported with a positive, accumulated exporting value
by December 2015, then we define it as an exporter. Otherwise, it is treated as a
non-exporter. This characterizes the extensive margin of firm-level exporting. Even
more straightforwardly, the intensive margin is represented by the self-reported
export value in December that has been accumulated over the twelve months of
2015. Table 1 shows that around 45.2% SMEs in our sample of SMEDS exported
in 2015. We exclude firms that report missing values for export and other control
variables from our sample. There are 10,517 remaining firms of which 3,601 firms
report positive export revenues. Average export revenues (foreign sales) of these
exporters was around 31,000 yuan (approximately 4815 dollars in 2015). It also
reveals that both margins of exporting have substantial variation across firms when
we compare standard deviations with means. Table 1 further displays that SMEs in
Zhejiang on average sold more domestically than abroad. Average domestic sales
was more than 20,000 yuan higher than the average exporting value. Domestic
sales are also massively dispersed as the standard deviation is around 1.5 times
greater than the mean.
Credit Rationing SMEDS provides straightforward measures of credit ra-
tioning with regard to SMEs. Like Minetti and Zhu (2011), we could define two
types of credit rationing, that is, strong and weak rationing. Firms in SMEDS are
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viewed as weakly credit rationed in 2015 if they found it difficult to obtain external
finance (mainly banking loans) but were never asked by the banks to pay higher
interest rates when applying for loans. In contrast, strongly credit rationed firms
are those that found it difficult to obtain external finance, and were also asked
at least once by the banks to pay higher interest rates when applying for loans.
As for the weak rationing, our definition is comparable to that defined by Minetti
and Zhu (2011) because firms that found it difficult to obtain external finance
would generally like to receive more credits at the market interest rate. In terms
of the strong rationing, we argue that our definition is also essentially consistent
with the definition by Minetti and Zhu (2011). Though we do not have firm-level
information on whether firms’ applications for loans were denied or not by banks,
firms that were already asked by banks to pay higher interest rates yet still found
it difficult to obtain external finance would generally be those that were rejected
by banks when applying for loans.
Table 1 indicates that around 3.4% and 8.5% of SMEs in Zhejiang were strongly
and weakly credit rationed, respectively. It is more noticeable that both measures
of credit rationing show massive cross-sectional variation, hence providing us a
great opportunity to identify the impacts of credit rationing on SMEs’ exporting
performance. To gain some intuition for the impacts, we plot county-level share of
firms that were strongly credit rationed in 2015 against two margins of exporting,
that is, the county-level share of exporters and the county-level log average export
value.
[Figure 1 is to be here]
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Figure 1 exhibits a strong negative correlation between credit rationing and
both margins of exporting. It intuitively suggests that firms located in more credit
rationed counties are less likely to export smaller amounts conditional on export-
ing.
Control Variables When we explore the effects of credit rationing on SME
export performance, we control for a large set of firm characteristics recorded in
SMEDS to avoid issues like omitted variables. Firm-level financial health is includ-
ed to control for the case that financially healthier firms might be less likely to
experience credit rationing and also more likely to participate in exporting or ex-
port more, conditional on exporting. Three measures of financial health (liquidity,
leverage ratio, and cash flow) are employed in this study, in line with Minetti and
Zhu (2011) and many others (e.g. Greenaway et al., 2007). Liquidity is defined as
a binary variable which equals to 1 if a firm has sufficient liquidity and equals to
0 otherwise. It is taken from a survey response from firms rather than a measure
inferred from firm-level financial status like the liquidity ratio defined as the ratio
between liquid assets and short-term liabilities. We divide total liabilities by total
assets to define the leverage ratio, while cash flow is directly obtained from the
microeconomic data. Table 1 demonstrates that only around 70% of SMEs report
that they have sufficient liquidity in the short term, while the rest face a shortage
of liquidity. It also indicates that SMEs are highly leveraged in our data since the
leverage ratio is around 2 and substantially dispersed (with a standard deviation
of more than 200). SMEs have an average cash flow of 6,438.2 yuan, and it varies
dramatically across firms.
We also include production-side information to control for the channel that
larger, more productive, more capital-intensive, and more innovative firms might
17
show less credit rationing and have better export performance. We construct three
variables to capture size, productivity, and capital intensity, respectively. Size is
proxied by employment and is measured as the total number of workers, while
labor productivity is captured by the output value per worker. Capital intensity
is defined as the ratio between fixed assets and employment. It is shown in Table
1 that SMEs on average have 134.5 workers per firm, and that labor productivity
is around 411.4 yuan per worker. SMEs further exhibit massive cross-sectional
variation in employment and capital intensity because the standard deviations are
much larger than means for these firms. In SMEDS, firm-level innovation can be
recovered by checking the total sales of new products. We define innovation as a
binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm reports positive sales for new products.
Table 1 reveals that 22.3% SMEs were engaged in product innovation in 2015, and
this specific type of innovation activity is quite dispersed.
Instruments We employ firm-level measures of housing investment and ac-
counts receivable as instrumental variables for credit rationing.16 As we discussed,
housing and accounts receivable are two particular types of collateral for firm-level
external financing in China. Housing has been widely accepted as collateral by
banks ever since the marketization of housing in the late 1990s, while accounts
receivable has been recently advocated by the central government to serve as col-
lateral. SMEDS collects firms’ housing information by asking the question “Does
the firm have investment in housing?” Therefore, we define housing investment as
a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm has investment in housing markets in
16We also use sectoral credit rationing ratio as instrument for firm-level credit rationing in the
robustness check section. The ratio is defined by the proportion of firms that are credit rationed
to all firms in a particular sector.
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2015. Accounts receivable is well recorded in SMEDS and can be used directly. We
show in Table 1 that around 25% of SMEs invested in housing markets in 2015,
and on average SMEs have an amount of accounts receivable as high as 29,885
yuan. This rationalizes the government’s efforts to promote the use of accounts
receivable as collateral against borrowing because it is quantitatively large even in
comparison to total sales. Theoretically, a firm that invests more in housing or has
greater accounts receivable would have greater financial capacity, and hence is less
likely to be credit rationed by banks. Again, to gain some intuition, we plot the
simple correlation patterns between county-level shares of credit rationed firms in
2015 and county-level measures of these two instruments, that is, the county-level
share of firms that have investments in housing and the county-level log average
accounts receivable.
[Figure 2 is to be here]
Figure 2 implies that SMEs doing business in counties with greater housing
investments and accounts receivable have a lower probability of being credit ra-
tioned since these collateral measures show reasonably negative correlation with
credit rationing.
4. Estimation and Results
In this section, we investigate the impact of credit rationing, either strong or
weak, on firm-level export behavior. In particular, we first examine how firm-level
credit rationing affects the firm’s export participation decision (extensive margin);
second, conditional on exporting, we study the influence of credit rationing on firm-
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level exports; lastly, we document the heterogeneous impact of credit rationing on
different firms.
4.1. Credit Rationing and Export Extensive Margins
We first examine the effect of credit rationing on the firm-level extensive margins
of exporting, that is, the probability of exporting. Entering foreign markets typi-
cally involves large start-up costs (Feenstra et al., 2014; Chaney, 2016; Bai et al.,
2017). In particular, Feenstra et al. (2014) show that exporters rely more on fi-
nancial credits. Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016) establish theoretic models and
both predict that financial constrained firms are more likely to be excluded from
exporting.
Let pii denote the difference between firm i’s operating profits when exporting
and its operating profits when not exporting.
pii = α1 + β1Ci +Xiγ1 + εi, (1)
where Ci is a binary variable which takes the value 1 if firm i is credit rationed,
0 otherwise; Xi is a vector containing firm-level characteristics which affect firm
i’s operating profits across export status. Specifically, Xi contains the firm-level
liquidity ratio, leverage ratio, cash flow, productivity in terms of value added per
worker, firm size, capital intensity and innovation status.17 εi captures unobserv-
able firm-level factors which may also affect pii.
17Innovation is a bivariate variable which takes the value 1 if firm i introduces new products,
0 otherwise. Cull and Xu (2003) demonstrate that when a firm introduces new products can be
seen as a sign of the firm’s future prospectives.
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Firm i will export if pii > 0. By assuming that εi follows a standard normal
distribution with zero mean and unit variance,18 firm i’s export probability can be
represented as:
prob(Exporti = 1) = Prob(α1 + β1Ci +Xiγ1 + εi > 0) (2)
= Φ(α1 + β1Ci +Xiγ1)
where Φ(·) represents the standard normal cdf. When a firm is credit rationed, it
will be more difficult for this firm to start exporting. As such, we expect β1 < 0.
We recognize that the degree of credit rationing, Ci, faced by each firm and
the firm-level export participation decision might be simultaneously affected by
unobservable firm-level characteristics. Also, the decision to enter export markets
may generate an increase in profitability, which can significantly improve the fir-
m’s financial health (Greenaway et al., 2007). Firm-level financial health plays
a signaling role to the financial market, and reduces the probability that a firm
is credit rationed.19 Either way, standard endogeneity issues arise. To address
these endogeneity issues, we model the probability of firm i being credit rationed
as follows:
prob(Ci = 1) = prob(Ziδ +Xiλ+ µi > 0) = Φ(Ziδ + Ziλ) (3)
where Zi contains variables which affect firm i’s credit rationing status, but do not
18Since the dependent variable is also binary, exporting or not, we cannot identify the variance
parameter, δ, as in linear regressions.
19Cull and Xu (2003) and Firth et al. (2009) both find that loans from commercial banks of
China favor firms that indicate profitability and financial health.
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affect the firm-level export participation decision. Xi represents the same firm-
level characteristics as in equation (1) and µi is a normally distributed random
error term with zero mean and unit variance. The reason we include firm-level
characteristics in equation (3) is because the lenders, e.g. the commercial banks
in China, give loans to firms based on their characteristics (credit risks), such as
profitability and signal a firm reveals (Cull and Xu, 2003; Firth et al., 2009). In
contrast to recent literature, we use firm-level variables, Zi, rather than province-
level or sector-level data, to predict the probability of firm-level credit rationing.
As a robustness check, we also construct the sectoral rationing rate as an in-
strument for firm-level credit rationing.20 Specifically, we use firm-level housing
investment status and the value of receivables, along with other firm-level char-
acteristics to predict the probability of credit rationing. As described in section
2, firms can use their housing investments and receivables to obtain mortgage
loans. We expect δ < 0, which implies that firms with housing investments or
greater receivables are more likely to obtain loans from the financial market, e.g.
commercial banks, and hence less likely to be credit rationed. At the same time,
firm-level real estate investments and receivables are unlikely to correlate with un-
observed characteristics which affect a firm’s export decision. The advantage of
using firm-level variables is that it allows us to avoid clustering the estimated s-
tandard errors to a more aggregate level; Also, the economic policy and features in
housing markets in China make firm-level real estate investments and receivables
strongly correlated with firm-level credit rationing. This strong correlation alle-
viates the concerns of weak instruments; Last, as our observed firms are all from
20All results are available in the robustness checks.
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one province, Zhejiang province, province-level instruments will lack the necessary
variation for identification.
In equation (2), the binary feature of the dependent variables leads to biased
estimates from 2SLS (see, Greene (2002) for more details). Therefore, we estimate
the recursive bivariate Probit model constituted by equations (2) and (3) through
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). Results are reported in Table 2 and Table
3.
[Table 2 is to be here]
[Table 3 is to be here]
Table 2 and Table 3 report the effect of strong and weak credit rationing on
firms’ export participation decisions, respectively. Column (1) of Table 2 (Table
3) displays the estimates of equation (2) by treating the measure of strong credit
rationing (weak credit rationing) as exogenous. The results suggest that either
strong or weak credit rationing has a statistically insignificant effect on the firm-
level export participation decision.
Columns (2) and (3) report the estimates for the bivariate Probit model of
equations (2) and (3), in which we use firm-level housing investment status as an
instrument for credit rationing. The results reveal several pieces of information:
first, a firm’s housing investment status has a negative and statistically significant
effect on the probability that a firm is credit rationed. In particular, it is less
likely that a firm is credit rationed if the firm has invested in housing; second,
credit rationing, either strong or weak, has a negative and significant impact on
firm-level export participation decisions. That is, firms that face credit rationing
are less likely to export. Third, the estimated correlation coefficient corr(εi, µi)
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is 0.45 for strong credit, and 0.32 for weak credit with standard errors of 0.08
and 0.06, respectively. This implies that the unobserved firm-level characteristics
which determine firms’ credit rationing (µi) and export participation decision (εi)
are positively correlated. Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that credit rationing
is exogenous. In addition, the coefficients for control variables have their expected
signs. In particular, firm-level liquidity increases the firm-level export partici-
pation probability, and the leverage ratio reduces this probability.21 Firm-level
productivity measured by value added per worker and firm size both positively
affect firm export participation although the effect is small. Further, firms that
introduce new products are more likely to export.
Similar to columns (2) and (3), columns (4) and (5) show results for the bi-
variate probit model of equations (2) and (3), but we use both firm-level housing
investments and receivables as instruments for credit rationing. The results again
demonstrate a negative and statistically significant effect from credit rationing,
either strong or weak, on the firm’s export participation decision. In addition,
a firm’s housing investment status, and amount of receivables reduce the likeli-
hood that the firm is credit rationed. Based on the estimates in columns (4) and
(5) in Table 2 and Table 3, we separately compute the marginal effect of strong
and weak credit rationing on firm-level export participation probabilities using
Φ(α1 + β1 + Ziγ1) − Φ(α1 + Ziγ1). We obtain a value of -0.360 for strong credit
rationing and -0.221 for weak credit rationing. This implies that strong (weak)
credit rationing reduces firm-level export probabilities by 36.0% (22.1%). Our re-
sults are highly comparable to those in Minetti and Zhu (2011), in which they find
21However, the effect of leverage ratio on firm-level export participation probability is not
statistically significant.
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a marginal effect of -0.38 from credit rationing on firm-level export decisions in
Italy.
A large fraction of the financial constraint literature uses firm-level liquidity
ratios and leverage ratios to proxy firm-level credit constraints (e.g. Greenaway et
al., 2007; Berman and He´ricout, 2010; Manova, 2013). Minetti and Zhu (2011) ad-
dress this literature by including these financial factors to proxy firm-level financial
conditions and to avoid omitted variable problems. Controlling for these financial
variables may also reduce the coefficient on the measure of credit rationing. To
make a direct comparison, we estimate the bivariate probit model of equation (2)
and (3) omitting liquidity ratio and leverage ratio. The results are reported in
Table 4.
[Table 4 is to be here]
Panel A of Table 4 displays the different effect of strong credit rationing on firm-
s’ export participation probabilities with and without including financial variables.
The results in columns (1) and (3) of Panel A are taken directly from columns (3)
and (5) of Table 1, respectively. It is clear that after excluding financial variables,
the magnitude of the coefficient on strong credit rationing increases. In panel B,
we have very similar findings for weak credit rationing.
4.2. Credit Rationing and Export Intensive Margins
In this section, we investigate the impact of credit rationing on the firm-level
intensive margin of exports. We replace the dependent variable, export probability,
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in equation (2) by firm-level export value yi, and have the following specification:
yi = α2 + β2Ci +Xiγ2 + vi, (4)
where Ci characterizes whether firm i faces credit rationing. It takes the value
1 if the answer is yes, 0 otherwise; Xi contains firm-level characteristics as in
specification (2). Two caveats arise from OLS estimates from equation (4). First,
Ci, may be endogenous in equation (4) due to omitted variables as in equation
(2); second, only firms participating in exporting have positive export values,
which leads to a sample selection issue. In order to alleviate the first concern, we
still employ an instrument variable approach. However, we notice that the credit
rationing measure, Ci, is binary which makes two-stage least square (2SLS) biased.
Instead, we modify the 2SLS as follows: in the first stage, we estimate equation
(2) to obtain the fitted probability of credit rationing, Ĉi; in the second stage,
we use Ĉi along with firm-level housing investment and receivable as instruments
for Ci when estimating equation (4). This approach is also called the forbidden
regression. To deal with the sample selection bias, we use a Heckman type sample
selection model by adding an inverse Mill’s ratio to equation (4). All results are
reported in Table 5.
[Table 5 is to be here]
Columns (1)-(3) and columns (4)-(6) document the estimated effect of strong
and weak credit rationing on firm-level export values, respectively. Columns (1)
and (4) report the OLS estimates from equation (4) when we treat credit rationing
as exogenous. The results suggest a negative and statistically significant effect of
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both strong and weak credit rationing on firm-level export values. Columns (2)
and (5) show the results for strong and weak credit rationing using IV estimation.
Although the coefficient of credit rationing is still negative, it becomes statistically
insignificant after taking endogeneity of credit rationing into account. Columns
(3) and (6) separately report the IV estimates after adding an inverse Mill’s ratio.
Again, the coefficient on credit rationing is negative and statistically significant,
and the magnitude is larger than that of the OLS estimates. Specifically, the
point estimate from strong credit rationing is -3.622 (column (3)). This coefficient
is large and has a 95% confidence interval of -1.052 to -6.192. This suggests that
after controlling for all other factors, strong credit rationing reduces foreign sales
by more than 66%.22 Weak credit rationing will reduce foreign sales by more than
32% according to the same calculation.
All results imply that credit rationing has nontrivial effects on firm-level export
behavior not only by preventing firms from paying the huge start-up fixed cost to
start importing, but also through restricting firms from reducing their variable
export costs which determine firm-level exports. Our results are consistent with
Arkolakis (2011) and Aw et al. (2011). Arkolakis (2011) emphasizes the existence
of huge fixed costs to penetrate the foreign market for new exporters, and firms
that cannot afford this huge penetration cost cannot generate sufficient profits
from exporting. Credit rationed firms cannot finance the huge marketing costs
and hence choose not to export. In contrast, Aw et al. (2011) document that
successful exporters spend huge investments in R&D to improve their productivity
22Since foreign sales are in logarithm, a coefficient of -1.052 implies that foreign sales by credit
rationed firms are 34% (=exp(-1.052)) of those by non-rationed firms, which means that strong
credit rationing reduces foreign sales more than 66%.
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(lower marginal costs). For firms that face credit rationing, their R&D activities
are refrained. Compared to firms that invest in R&D (not financially constrained
firms), these credit rationed firms have relatively low exports due to their relatively
high marginal production costs.
4.3. Credit Rationing and Domestic Sales
It is of both academic and policy interest to compare the influence of credit ra-
tioning on firms’ foreign and domestic sales. Due to the comprehensive information
offered by SMEDS, we can observe both firm-level foreign and domestic sales. In
this section, we examine the effect of credit rationing on firm-level domestic sales.
We estimate equation (4) by replacing export values with domestic sales. The
results are reported in Table 6.
[Table 6 is to be here]
Since every firm in our sample reports positive domestic sales, there is no sam-
ple selection issue as in the export case. Columns (1) and (2) report the estimated
effect of strong credit rationing on firm-level domestic sales. Column (1) reports
the results from OLS regression when we treat credit rationing as exogenous, and in
column (2) firm-level housing investments and receivables are used as instruments
for credit rationing. Column (2) indicates that after controlling for endogeneity,
strong credit rationing has a negative effect on firm-level domestic sales, but this
effect only statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. In contrast, weak
credit rationing has a statistically insignificant effect on firm-level domestic sales,
no matter whether we consider the OLS estimates or IV estimates. Furthermore,
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the magnitude of the estimated effect of credit rationing on domestic sales is small-
er than that on foreign sales (-1.173 V.S. 0.096 for strong credit rationing; -0.475
V.S. -0.017 for weak credit rationing). These results are in line with Minetti and
Zhu (2011) and suggest that credit rationing disproportionately affects firm-level
export sales. One possible interpretation is that it is more costly to establish dis-
tribution systems in foreign markets, and credit rationed firms must incur greater
distribution costs in foreign markets which in turn lead to fewer foreign sales.
5. Heterogeneous Effect of Credit Rationing
In the above analysis, we have characterized the average effect of credit rationing
on firm-level export behaviors. A vast amount of literature indicates that financial
constraints exhibit heterogeneous effects on firm-level export performance. Manova
et al. (2015), for instance, demonstrate that financial constraints have more pro-
nounced impact on less productive firms and firms that belong to more financially
vulnerable sectors. Bai et al. (2017) and Cheng et al. (2017) show that relative
to direct exporters, firms that engage in indirect exporting (exporting through
intermediaries) are affected less by financial constraints due to their different cost
structure. In this section, we study the heterogeneous effect of credit rationing
across firms. The heterogeneous effects of credit rationing on export participation
for different firms are reported in Table 7 and 8.
[Table 7 is to be here]
[Table 8 is to be here]
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Table 7 and 8 display the heterogeneous effects of strong and weak credit
rationing on firm export participation decisions, respectively. Columns (1) and
(2) in Table 7 reveal the heterogeneous effect of strong credit rationing on firms
with insufficient and sufficient liquidity. The results indicate that strong credit
rationing reduces export participation probability only for firms with insufficient
liquidity. In contrast, strong credit rationing has a statistically insignificant effect
on firms with sufficient liquidity. One possible interpretation is that firms with
sufficient liquidity can finance their start-up fixed costs in foreign markets using
their own internal finance.
Columns (3)-(4) show the differential effects of strong credit rationing on multi-
product and single-product firms, respectively. The results suggest that the impact
of credit rationing is more pronounced for multi-product firms. This might be
because that multi-product firms are also potential multi-product exporters. As
such, they rely more on external finance to pay for a larger start-up fixed cost to
enter into the foreign markets.23
Column (5) lists the estimated effect of strong credit rationing on firms that
obtain collateral from other firms. Column (6) displays the estimated effect of
strong credit rationing on firms which do not obtain collateral from other firms.
The results indicate that firms that obtain collateral from other firms rely more
on external finance to start exporting. One possible explanation is that obtaining
collateral from other firms is a good signal of a firm’s growth prospective. As such,
firms that obtain collateral from other firms are more likely to expand and export
23Manova and Zhang (2012) document that multi-product exporters usually enter into more
foreign markets, which require multiple market entry costs. This increases external finance
reliance for multi-product firms.
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if they access to external finance (not credit rationed). In contrast, due to the
poor growth prospective, firms without external collateral are less likely to export
even if they have access to external finance. Therefore, credit rationing has trivial
effect on firms without external collateral. We calculate the different export ratios
between firms with and without external collateral in our sample. We find that
among firms that obtain external collateral the export ratio is 62.3%, while the
export ratio for firms without external collateral is 34.0%. The significant gap in
export ratio between the two groups of firms supports our explanation.
Columns (7) and (8) report the results for firms with a high capital utilization
rate and low capital utilization rate, respectively. We treat firms whose capital
utilization rates above the median utilization rate as high capital utilizing firms,
and firms whose capital utilization rate below the median utilization rate as low
capital utilizing firms. The results demonstrate that credit rationing has a more
pronounced effect on firms with a high capital utilization rate. Low capital uti-
lization rates may reveal organization or management inefficiency, which prevents
firms from exporting regardless of whether these firms have access to external fi-
nance. This leads to a statistically insignificant effect of credit rationing on firms
with low capital utilization rates. In contrast, high capital utilization rate firms are
more efficiently organized, and hence more sensitive to external credit rationing.
In Table 8 we observe very similar patterns to those documented in Table 7. In
particular, the results indicate that weak credit rationing exhibits stronger effects
on firm-level export participation for firms with insufficient liquidity, multi-product
firms, firms which obtain collateral from other firms, and firms with high capital
utilization rates.
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Next, we examine the heterogeneous effects of credit rationing on the firm-level
intensive margin of exports. The results are reported in Table 9 and 10.
[Table 9 is to be here]
[Table 10 is to be here]
Tables 9 and 10 document the heterogeneous effect of strong and weak cred-
it rationing on firm-level intensive margin of exports, respectively. Columns (1)
and (2) in Table 9 report the effect of strong credit on export values for firms
with insufficient and sufficient liquidity, respectively. Results show that although
strong credit rationing reduces firm-level export values for both firms with suffi-
cient liquidity and those without sufficient liquidity, the effect is only statistically
significant for the former case. A possible reason could be that firms with suf-
ficient liquidity can finance the R&D investment which decreases their marginal
cost. As such, additional external credits do not help them to further decrease
their marginal cost and hence have no significant effect on improving their sales.
Columns (3) and (4) report the heterogeneous effect of strong credit rationing
on multi-product and single-product firms, respectively. The results imply that
strong credit rationing reduces export values for both multi-product and single-
product firms, and this effect is statistically significant.24 The effect that strong
credit rationing has on export values for multi-product firms almost double than
that on single-product firms (-1.583 V.S. -0.854). We offer two possible interpre-
tations for the observed evidence. First, firms can make use of external finance to
improve their distribution system in foreign markets, which reduces the variable
24For multi-product firms, the effect is statistically significant at 99% confidence level, but for
single-product firms, the effect is only statistically significant at 90% confidence level.
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transportation costs and multi-product firms benefit more from a better functional
distribution system as they can deliver various products through the same system
(intensive margin). This leads to a larger effect from credit rationing on export
sales for multi-product firms. Second, multi-product firms often export their core
products and sell products far from their core competence in the domestic market-
s (see, Manova and Zhang, 2012; Bernard et al., 2010). Access to more external
finance leads multi-product firms to export more varieties (extensive margin).
Column (5) reports the effect of strong credit rationing on firms that obtain
collateral from other firms, while column (6) reports the effect on firms that do
not obtain any external collateral. In contrast to the findings for extensive margin,
strong credit rationing has no statistically significant effect on the intensive margin
of exports for firms with external collateral. However, strong rationing does reduce
firm-level export values for firms that do not have external collateral. One possible
interpretation is that firms that do not obtain external collateral, are unable to
do so because of their poor growth prospective, which usually due to their less
developed production technology, or poor production organization, etc. External
credits can better serve these firms by improving their productivity, reducing their
marginal costs, and boosting their export values.
Columns (7) and (8) reveal the heterogeneous effect on firms with high and
low capital utilization rates, respectively. The results demonstrate that strong
credit rationing significantly reduce firm-level export values for firms with low
capital utilization rates (column (8)). In contrast, the effect on firms with high
capital utilization rates is statistically insignificant. The results might be driven
by that firms with high capital utilization rates which are efficiently organized in
their production, and additional external credits cannot help them further decrease
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their marginal costs through improving organization efficiency.
Table 10 displays the heterogeneous effects of weak credit rationing on firm-
level export values. We observe very similar patterns as those in Table 9, except
that the magnitude on the coefficient for weak credit rationing is smaller than
that of strong credit rationing. This implies that weak credit rationing plays a less
pronounced role on firm export values relative to strong credit rationing.
6. Robustness
In this section, we check the robustness of our results using different instruments
for credit rationing. In the literature, province-level financial market development
is usually used as an instrument for an individual firm’s credit rationing. However,
in our case, all firms are located in the same province, Zhejiang, which invalidates
any instrument constructed at province level. Therefore, in a robustness check, we
attempt to use the sectoral credit rationing rate as an instrument for the individual
firm’s degree of credit rationing.
The Chinese government has enacted a series of policies aiming to relieve firm
financial constraints in clean energy and high-tech industries. The state council of
the People’s Republic of China in 2013, for instance, announced “Guiding opinions
of the State Council on resolving the serious surplus of production capacity ” to
alleviate the negative effect of financial constraints on firms within steel, cement,
Nonferrous metal smelting and rolling processing, transport equipment industry
(State Council document no.41 [2013]). In 2014, the general office of the state
council of the People’s Republic of China issued “Guidance on Duocuobingju ef-
forts to alleviate the problem of high cost of corporate finance” (State Council
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document no.39 [2014]) to reduce SMEs’ financial costs in service, clean energy,
and agriculture sectors. In addition, to boost high-tech, information technology
(IT), clean energy and strategic emerging industries, the state council enacted
“Guiding opinions on financial support, economic restructuring and upgrading” to
increase the financial support to these industries in 2013. All these policies suggest
heterogeneous degrees of financial constraints at the sector-level.
We construct the rationing rate in industry j as sectorj =
rnumj
numj
, where sectorj
represent the ratio of firms that face strong (weak) rationing in industry j. rnumj
denotes the number of firms that face strong (weak) credit rationing in industry
j, and numj is the total number of firms in industry j. sectorj captures the
degree of financial constraints in industry j, which will affect the credit rationing
of firms in that industry. However, it is not likely to be correlated with firm i’s
unobserved characteristics which, in turn, determine firm i’s export behaviors.
We use sectorj as an instrument for firm-level credit rationing and estimate the
impact of credit rationing on firm-level export extensive and intensive margins,
respectively. Results are reported in Table 11.
[Table 11 is to be here]
The results in Table 11 show that sector-level credit rationing rate has a positive
effect on an individual firm’s credit rationing. This implies that a representative
firm that belongs to a more financially constrained industry is more likely to be
credit rationed. Furthermore, both strong and weak credit rationing have negative
and statistically significant effects on firm-level extensive and intensive export mar-
gins. The magnitude of the coefficients in each regression are highly comparable
to our previous results where we use firm-level housing investment and receivables
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as instruments for credit rationing.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the impact of credit rationing on export performance
for SMEs in China. The results indicate that SMEs which are credit rationed are
less likely to export and conditioning on exporting will export fewer. The effect
of credit rationing is more pronounced on firm export participation for firms that
with insufficient liquidity, produce multi-product, obtain more external collateral,
and with a higher capital utilization rate. In contrast, the effect of credit rationing
on firm export values is stronger for firms with insufficient liquidity, multi-product
firms, firms without external collateral, and firms with a lower capital utilization
rate.
In order to alleviate the endogeneity concern of credit rationing, we construct
novel firm-level instruments for credit rationing rather than using province-level
instruments, that is, firm-level housing investments and receivables. We find that
the probability that firm-level credit rationing is significantly decreasing in firm-
level housing investments and receivables, which may suggest that state-owned
banks in China use firm-level signals to allocate their loans across SMEs, and
there are significant differences in the opportunity to access external finance. These
firm-level instruments can effectively eliminate the concern of weak instruments
and allow us to avoid aggregating the standard error.
The effect of credit rationing on export performance for SMEs in China has
no significant difference from that on SMEs in developed countries, like Italy.
This may suggest that SMEs in China are quite similar to their counterparts in
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developed countries, at least in terms of their reliance on external finance.
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Figure 1: Simple correlations between credit rationing and exporting
Notes. Panel (A) plots county-level share of firms that are strongly rationed and county-level
share of exporters among all firms. Both shares are constructed for 2015. Panel (B) plots county-
level share of strongly rationed firms and county-level log average exporting value. The average
exporting value is constructed for 2015 as well. The red solid lines are the linear fitted lines.
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Figure 2: Simple correlations between credit rationing and its instruments
Notes. Panel (A) plots county-level share of firms that have investment in housing markets and
county-level share of firms that are strongly rationed. Both shares are constructed for 2015.
Panel (B) plots county-level log average accounts receivable and count-level share of strongly
rationed firms. The average accounts receivable is constructed for 2015. The red solid line is the
linear fitted line.
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Table 1: Summary statistics.
Variables Mean Standard deviation Number of observations
Credit rationing:
Strong rationing 0.034 0.182 14249
Weak rationing 0.085 0.279 14249
Exporting and Sales:
Export participation 0.452 0.498 14249
Foreign sales of exporters31062.2 467417.5 6336
Domestic sales 51802.6 771773.8 14028
Firm Characteristics:
Liquidity 0.707 0.455 12119
Leverage ratio 2.055 202.745 11932
Cash flow 6438.2 96398.6 11685
Labor productivity 411.4 17174.9 11772
Employment 134.5 634.4 12089
Fixed assets/employment 255.3 9022.3 10838
Innovation 0.223 0.416 14249
Housing investment 0.247 0.431 14249
Accounts receivable 29885.0 429981.0 12102
Notes. This table reports summary statistics of key variables used in our empirical analysis.
Strongly rationed firms find it difficult to obtain external finance and are asked by banks to
pay higher interest rates, while weakly rationed firms only satisfy the first condition. Export
participation equals to 1 if the firm is an exporter and 0 otherwise. Foreign and domestic sales
are measured in Chinese yuan. Liquidity is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the firm
has sufficient liquidity and 0 otherwise. Leverage ratio is defined as total liabilities/total assets.
Cash flow denoted with Chinese yuan. Labor productivity is output value (in Chinese yuan)
per worker. Employment is the total number of workers, and fixed assets/employment defines
capital intensity. Innovation is a binary variable equal to 1 if the firm is engaged in product
innovation and 0 otherwise. Housing investment takes a value of 1 if the firm invests in housing
markets and 0 otherwise. Accounts receivable is measured in Chinese yuan.
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Table 4: Exporting Participation: financial variables
Bivariate (IV1) Bivariate (IV2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Strong Rationing
rationing s −1.274*** −1.304*** −1.228*** −1.649***
(0.258) (0.204) (0.0751) (0.098)
LR a 0.078** 0.075**
(0.033) (0.035)
Leverage -0.008 -0.009
(0.018) (0.018)
Panel B: Weak Rationing
rationing w −0.478** −0.515** −0.510*** −0.560**
(0.245) (0.243) (0.251) (0.241)
LR a 0.068* 0.072*
(0.044) (0.048)
Leverage -0.012 -0.021
(0.018) (0.008)
Note: Columns (1)-(2) report estimates for exporting equation of the bivariate probit model by using house
investment as IV for credit rationing. Compared to column (1), column (2) excludes financial variables, liquidity
ratio and leverage ratio. Similarly, columns (3)-(4) report estimates for exporting equation by using both house
investment and receivable payments as IV for credit rationing. Panel A contains results for strong credit rationing,
and Panel B contains results for weak credit rationing. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and
10% respectively.
48
T
a
b
le
5
:
C
re
d
it
R
a
ti
o
n
in
g
a
n
d
E
x
p
o
rt
In
te
n
si
v
e
m
a
rg
in
s
S
tr
on
g
R
at
io
n
in
g
W
ea
k
R
at
io
n
in
g
O
L
S
2S
L
S
2S
L
S
+
S
el
ec
ti
on
O
L
S
2S
L
S
2S
L
S
+
S
el
ec
ti
on
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
ra
ti
on
in
g
s
-0
.1
10
-0
.7
32
-3
.6
22
**
*
-0
.2
68
**
*
-1
.1
04
-0
.7
68
**
*
(0
.1
50
)
(0
.5
03
)
(1
.3
11
)
(0
.0
99
)
(1
.1
99
)
(0
.1
91
)
L
R
a
-0
.0
68
0.
03
1
0.
66
0*
*
-0
.0
36
-0
.0
73
0.
28
0*
(0
.0
66
)
(0
.0
72
)
(0
.2
95
)
(0
.0
67
)
(0
.1
82
)
(0
.1
68
)
L
ev
er
ag
e
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
40
-0
.0
17
-0
.0
00
-0
.0
35
-0
.0
17
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
01
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
38
)
C
as
h
fl
ow
0.
08
1*
**
0.
08
1*
**
0.
10
3*
**
0.
08
0*
**
0.
09
1*
**
0.
08
7*
**
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
25
)
(0
.0
21
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
22
)
T
F
P
0.
26
0*
**
0.
27
0*
**
0.
22
4*
**
0.
26
1*
**
0.
28
3*
**
0.
26
6
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
44
)
(0
.0
36
)
(0
.0
37
)
(0
.0
37
)
S
iz
e
0.
56
9*
**
0.
58
0*
**
0.
63
0*
**
0.
56
8*
**
0.
54
2*
**
0.
60
8*
**
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
41
)
(0
.0
49
)
(0
.0
40
)
(0
.0
42
)
(0
.0
45
)
C
ap
it
al
in
t
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
28
-0
.0
18
**
*
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
25
-0
.0
25
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
22
)
(0
.0
19
)
(0
.0
20
)
(0
.0
20
)
In
n
ov
at
io
n
0.
02
7
0.
02
0
0.
15
1*
0.
03
0
0.
08
8
0.
11
4*
**
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
65
)
(0
.0
88
)
(0
.0
63
)
(0
.0
69
)
(0
.0
34
)
In
d
u
st
ry
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
w
n
er
sh
ip
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
F
ir
st
st
ag
e
re
gr
es
si
on
of
cr
ed
it
ed
ra
ti
on
in
g
0.
31
0*
*
0.
86
5*
**
fi
tt
ed
P
ro
b
of
ra
ti
on
in
g
(0
.2
03
)
(0
.0
84
)
R
2
0.
19
0.
10
0.
19
0.
19
0.
20
0.
20
O
b
s
3,
60
1
3,
60
1
3,
60
1
3,
60
1
3,
60
1
3,
60
1
N
o
te
:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
re
p
o
rt
s
es
ti
m
a
te
s
o
f
E
q
.(
4
).
C
o
lu
m
n
1
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fr
o
m
th
e
si
n
g
le
P
ro
b
it
m
o
d
el
,
w
h
il
e
co
lu
m
n
s
(2
)-
(3
)
a
n
d
co
lu
m
n
s
(4
)-
(5
)
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
re
su
lt
s
fr
o
m
th
e
b
iv
a
ri
a
te
P
ro
b
it
m
o
d
el
w
it
h
d
iff
er
en
t
se
ts
o
f
IV
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
∗∗
∗,∗
∗,∗
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
le
v
el
s
o
f
1
%
,
5
%
a
n
d
1
0
%
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
49
Table 6: Credit Rationing and Domestic Sales
Strong Rationing Weak Rationing
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
rationing s 0.054*** -0.096* 0.042*** -0.017
(0.019) (0.052) (0.012) (0.027)
LR a 0.072*** 0.080*** 0.069*** 0.077***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Leverage -0.014*** -0.014** -0.015*** -0.015**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Cash flow 0.090*** 0.106*** 0.090*** 0.106***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
TFP 0.370*** 0.413*** 0.347*** 0.413***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Size 0.347*** 0.662*** 0.591*** 0.662***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Capital int 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.032*** 0.038
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Innovation 0.084*** 0.035 0.083*** 0.035***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ownership FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
First stage regression
of credited rationing -7.566*** -6.907
fitted Prob of rationing (0.063) (0.042)
R2 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.44
Obs 10,517 10,517 10,517 10,517
Note: The table reports estimates of Eq.(4). Column 1 reports the estimates from the single probit model, while
columns (2)-(3) and columns (4)-(5) report the results from the bivariate probit model with different sets of IV,
respectively. ∗ ∗ ∗,∗∗,∗ indicate significance at the levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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